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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Demint appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his petition for postconviction relief. He argues the district court erred in dismissing one of his post-conviction
claims because the district court failed to give any notice of its reason for the claim’s dismissal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Demint’s petition for post-conviction relief relates to a criminal case arising out of
Ada County, CR 2014-12188. In that case, Mr. Demint was charged with four offenses:
trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to deliver,
unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.174.) These
charges arose from a traffic stop and subsequent search of Mr. Demint’s vehicle. (R., pp.173–
74.) Mr. Demint’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic
stop. (R., p.174.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.174.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Mr. Demint pled guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm.
(R., pp.174–75.) His guilty plea was conditional, and he reserved the right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.174–75.) The district court sentenced
Mr. Demint to twenty years, with ten years fixed, for trafficking in methamphetamine and five
years, with two and one-half years fixed, for unlawful possession of a firearm, to be served
consecutively. (R., p.172.)
On appeal, Mr. Demint challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
(R., p.175.) See also State v. Demint, 161 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 2016). The Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s order denying Mr. Demint’s motion. (R., p.175.) See also Demint,
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161 Idaho at 234. The Idaho Supreme Court denied review on December 12, 2016. (R., p.172
n.2.)
On January 20, 2017, Mr. Demint filed a timely pro se verified petition for postconviction relief. (R., pp.6–33.) Along with other ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
Mr. Demint argued:
[Trial counsel] Mr. Miller never argued that pursuant to Terry v. Ohio1 that this
was a routine traffic stop and should have been treated as such. If law
enforcement had information to effect a search then they should have used that
procedural process instead of utiliz[ing] a traffic stop, in order to initiate a
narcotics search. In this case law enforcement used the traffic stop for that sole
purpose. This violated the Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment [rights]. The stop[’]s
only tolerable duration is determined by the seizure’s “mission” which is to
address the traffic infraction that warranted the stop, Illinois v. Caballes,2 and
attend to related safety concerns.
(R., pp.18–19.) Later on in his petition, Mr. Demint reiterated the holdings from Terry and
Caballes and further argued:
Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed. The Fourth Amendment may tolerate
certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen the roadside detention, but a
traffic stop becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete the mission of issuing a warning ticket.
(R., pp.23–24 (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Relatedly, Mr. Demint argued:
In this instance, Deputy Lowery was acting on a narcotics tip from a Detective
Roberson. The traffic stop was predicated upon this fact. This was the only
“mission” of the traffic stop. Detective Roberson’s failure to secure an
anticipatory search warrant based on the information obtained from the
[confidential informant] was fundamentally a manifest error. Detective Roberson
knew that his evidence to obtain a search warrant was insufficient so he and other
Detectives, as well as Deputy Lowry and [Sergeant] Clifford utilized a traffic stop
to initiate a warrantless search.

1
2

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
543 U.S. 405 (2005).
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(R., p.28.) He submitted the police officers’ conduct violated the due process clause, Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. (R., p.28.) Finally, he asserted, “Deputy Lowry’s intent was not the traffic stop or
the welfare of the occupants . . . .” (R., p.29.)
Along with his petition, Mr. Demint also moved for the appointment of counsel.
(R., p.32.) The district court granted his motion. (R., p.37.)
On May 12, 2017, the State answered and moved for summary disposition. (R., pp.55–56,
57–70, 71–72.) The State generally moved for dismissal because Mr. Demint’s claims “fail to
raise genuine issues of material fact, are barred, are bare and conclusory, and are disproven by
the record.” (R., p.71.) For the legality of the traffic stop claim, the State argued Mr. Demint’s
claim was disproven by the record because his trial counsel challenged the validity of the traffic
stop. (R., pp.66–67.)
At a hearing on June 7, 2017, the district court gave Mr. Demint thirty days to respond to
the State’s motion for summary disposition. (Tr., p.15, Ls.3–4.) On July 25, 2015, Mr. Demint
moved to stay the proceedings and for leave to file an amended petition. (R., pp.149–56.) The
district court denied the motion. (R., pp.157–58.)
On August 9, 2017, the district court filed notice of its intent to dismiss in twenty days
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). (R., pp.160–70.) As for Mr. Demint’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim due to his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the traffic stop, the district court
explained:
Demint faults Mr. Miller for failing to argue that the traffic stop was
illegal because it was utilized by law enforcement as a way to avoid having to
obtain a search warrant based on the confidential informant’s tip. This claim is
disproven by the record. Mr. Miller’s motion to exclude filed on behalf of Demint
clearly stated that one basis for the motion was that the “stop by law enforcement
was invalid.” At the hearing, Mr. Miller proceeded to challenge Deputy Lowry
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about his observations of Demint’s traffic violations, including how Deputy
Lowry performed the speed estimate and whether the speed limit was indeed 55
mph where Demint was observed speeding. In addition, Mr. Miller had Demint
testify that he did not see a 55 mph sign prior to being pulled over. During oral
argument, Mr. Miller questioned whether the purpose of the stop was truly based
on traffic violations, pointing out that Demint was never actually cited for the
violations. Ultimately, the Court found Deputy Lowry to be more credible and
determined the stop was lawful based on Demint’s speeding and his failure to
properly utilize his turn signal. Thus because the record demonstrates Mr. Miller
did challenge the legality of the traffic stop, Demint’s claim is subject to
dismissal.
(R., pp.168–69.) Mr. Demint did not respond. On September 8, 2017, the district court ordered
the dismissal of Mr. Demint’s petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.172–82.) The district
court’s reasons for dismissal mirrored its notice of intent to dismiss. (Compare R., pp.164–70
with R., pp.176–82.) The district court issued a judgment the same day. (R., p.184.)
On September 19, 2017, Mr. Demint filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.86–87.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err by dismissing one of Mr. Demint’s post-conviction claims because the
district court failed to give any notice of its reason for dismissal?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Dismissing One Of Mr. Demint’s Post-Conviction Claims Because
The District Court Failed To Give Any Notice Of Its Reason For Dismissal

A.

Introduction
Mr. Demint contends the district court erred by dismissing one of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims because the district court failed to give any prior notice of its reason
for dismissal.

B.

General Legal Standards For Post-Conviction Appeals
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361

(2013).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application
for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24 (2000). Unlike
the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain more than “a short and plain statement of the
claim” that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The application must
include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must
state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must generally
show that (1) his attorney’s performance did not meet “an objective standard of reasonableness,”
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and (2) his attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687–88. “Although Strickland
concerned an allegation of ineffective assistance in a sentencing proceeding, the same standard
applies equally to claims arising from the plea process.” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850
(2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)).
The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction relief if
“there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). “In considering summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, the trial court must accept as true verified allegations of fact in the
application or in supporting affidavits, no matter how incredible they may appear, unless they
have been disproved by other evidence in the record.” Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909
(Ct. App. 1995). The district court is “required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as
true, but need not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Any
disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148
Idaho 44, 45 (2009). A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel will “survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes:
(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) a
material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner’s case.” Pratt v.
State, 134 Idaho 581, 583 (2000). If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272
(Ct. App. 2002).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
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affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Because the evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does
not involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only
determinations of law. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a district court’s summary
dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402–03 (2006).

C.

The District Court Erred By Dismissing One Of Mr. Demint’s Post-Conviction Claims
Due To A Lack Of Notice For Its Reason For Dismissal
“If a district court determines claims alleged in a petition do not entitle a petitioner to

relief, the court must provide notice of its intent to dismiss and allow the petitioner twenty days
to respond with additional facts to support his or her claims.” Diamond v. State, 161 Idaho 636,
640 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b); Crabtree v. State, 144 Idaho 489, 494 (Ct. App.
2006)). “The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure that the petitioner will have the
opportunity to challenge an adverse decision before it becomes final.” Baruth v. Gardner, 110
Idaho 156, 158–59 (Ct. App. 1986). “The court’s notice of intent to dismiss should provide
sufficiently particular information regarding the basis for its ruling so as to enable the petitioner
to supplement the petition with the necessary additional facts, if they exist.” Diamond, 161 Idaho
at 640–41 (citing Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493 (Ct. App. 2004)). “A notice is
insufficient if it merely reiterates the language of the Uniform Post–Conviction Procedure Act.”
Crabtree, 144 Idaho at 494 (citing Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954 (1993)). “A dismissal
under I.C. § 19-4906(b), whether the petitioner responds to a notice of intent to dismiss or not, is
a determination on the merits of the claims and is subject to appellate review.” Garza v. State,
139 Idaho 533, 537 (2003).
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In the case at hand, the district court notified Mr. Demint of its intent to dismiss pursuant
to under I.C. § 19-4906(b). (R., p.161.) The district court was expressly “invoking its statutory
authority under I.C. § 19-4906(b),” and not merely granting the State’s motion. Crabtree, 144
Idaho at 494. As such, “[t]he statutory duty to specify the reasons for the proposed dismissal
under I.C. 19-4906(b) rests solely with the district court and it is the district court alone who is
responsible for drafting the notice of intent to dismiss.” Diamond, 161 Idaho at 642 (citing
Crabtree, 144 Idaho at 494). Here, the district court failed to address one of Mr. Demint’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and thus provided no notice of its basis for dismissal.
Specifically, the district court did not address Mr. Demint’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the unlawful extension of the traffic stop for a
drug investigation. (R., pp.18–19, 23–24, 28, 29.) Although the district court gave notice of its
intent to dismiss Mr. Demint’s claim based on the initial legality of the traffic stop, the district
court gave no notice of its basis to dismiss his claim related to an unlawfully prolonged or
extended traffic stop. (See R., pp.168–69.) Therefore, the district court’s notice of intent to
dismiss “was insufficient to allow [Mr. Demint] a meaningful opportunity to respond to the
intended dismissal.” Diamond, 161 Idaho at 641. Due to the district court’s failure to provide any
notice of its reason to dismiss, the district court erred by dismissing this unaddressed claim, and
this case must be remanded for proper consideration of the claim. See id. at 642.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Demint respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment and
its order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as to this unaddressed claim
and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2018.

_________/s/________________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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